HSCA Wrote:Dear Mr. Breckinridge:
In connection with its investigations into the circumstances surrounding the death of President Kennedy, the Select Committee on Assassinations has been informed that during the summer of 1962, a CIA contact report concerning the Minsk Radio Plant was routed tot eh Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet Branch of the Directorate of Intelligence. The source of this contact report is believed to have been a former Marine and defector to the Soviet Union who returned to the United States with his family during the summer of 1962. The source is believed to have stated that he had been employed at the Minsk Radio Plant. The Committee has been further informed that this contact report was filed in a volume of material concerning the Minsk Radio Plant and that this volume is retrievable from the CIA's Industrial Registry Branch, which in 1962, was a component of the Office of Central Reference.

Ben Holmes Wrote:The House Select Committee on Assassinations wrote the following information request to the CIA:

HSCA Wrote:Dear Mr. Breckinridge:
In connection with its investigations into the circumstances surrounding the death of President Kennedy, the Select Committee on Assassinations has been informed that during the summer of 1962, a CIA contact report concerning the Minsk Radio Plant was routed tot eh Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet Branch of the Directorate of Intelligence. The source of this contact report is believed to have been a former Marine and defector to the Soviet Union who returned to the United States with his family during the summer of 1962. The source is believed to have stated that he had been employed at the Minsk Radio Plant. The Committee has been further informed that this contact report was filed in a volume of material concerning the Minsk Radio Plant and that this volume is retrievable from the CIA's Industrial Registry Branch, which in 1962, was a component of the Office of Central Reference.

(Mr. Breckinridge was the CIA coordinator for HSCA information requests)

I'm sure I don't have to remind those reading this that Lee Harvey Oswald was a former Marine who "defected" and worked at the Minsk Radio Plant, and returned to the U.S. with his family. No response by the CIA has been located.

Ben Holmes Wrote:Believers have no response to material like this - which gives the average person credible reason to believe that at the very least, Lee Harvey Oswald was an intelligence asset.

Those interested in more info can find this on pages 92-93 of Larry Hancock's excellent book, "Someone Would Have Talked"

Mark Ulrik Wrote:

Ben Holmes Wrote:The House Select Committee on Assassinations wrote the following information request to the CIA:

HSCA Wrote:Dear Mr. Breckinridge:
In connection with its investigations into the circumstances surrounding the death of President Kennedy, the Select Committee on Assassinations has been informed that during the summer of 1962, a CIA contact report concerning the Minsk Radio Plant was routed tot eh Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet Branch of the Directorate of Intelligence. The source of this contact report is believed to have been a former Marine and defector to the Soviet Union who returned to the United States with his family during the summer of 1962. The source is believed to have stated that he had been employed at the Minsk Radio Plant. The Committee has been further informed that this contact report was filed in a volume of material concerning the Minsk Radio Plant and that this volume is retrievable from the CIA's Industrial Registry Branch, which in 1962, was a component of the Office of Central Reference.

(Mr. Breckinridge was the CIA coordinator for HSCA information requests)

I'm sure I don't have to remind those reading this that Lee Harvey Oswald was a former Marine who "defected" and worked at the Minsk Radio Plant, and returned to the U.S. with his family. No response by the CIA has been located.

Perhaps not by you.

Mark Ulrik Wrote:

Ben Holmes Wrote:Believers have no response to material like this - which gives the average person credible reason to believe that at the very least, Lee Harvey Oswald was an intelligence asset.

Those interested in more info can find this on pages 92-93 of Larry Hancock's excellent book, "Someone Would Have Talked"

Apparently, the HSCA reviewed the files and found no contact report. Did Larry come to a different conclusion?

Ben Holmes Wrote:

Mark Ulrik Wrote:

Ben Holmes Wrote:The House Select Committee on Assassinations wrote the following information request to the CIA:

(Mr. Breckinridge was the CIA coordinator for HSCA information requests)

I'm sure I don't have to remind those reading this that Lee Harvey Oswald was a former Marine who "defected" and worked at the Minsk Radio Plant, and returned to the U.S. with his family. No response by the CIA has been located.

Perhaps not by you.

Nor the HSCA - with the full power of the U.S. Government behind it. But this isn't the only example of a federal agency simply refusing to answer questions in the JFK case.

Ben Holmes Wrote:

Mark Ulrik Wrote:

Ben Holmes Wrote:Believers have no response to material like this - which gives the average person credible reason to believe that at the very least, Lee Harvey Oswald was an intelligence asset.

Those interested in more info can find this on pages 92-93 of Larry Hancock's excellent book, "Someone Would Have Talked"

Apparently, the HSCA reviewed the files and found no contact report. Did Larry come to a different conclusion?

The 'conclusions' are crystal clear - the CIA did not want to answer - the reasoning is simple, there was only one former Marine employed in a Minsk Radio Plant who returned in 1962. This makes it extremely obvious that Oswald was, at the very least, an unwitting intelligence asset.

And just as supporters cannot explain the refusal of the Warren Commission to call James Chaney to testify, they cannot explain why the CIA simply refused to provide the contact report which was so concisely pinpointed by someone who'd seen it.

Ben Holmes Wrote:How can Larry come to any other conclusion? How would you be able to come to any other conclusion? The CIA didn't want to verify a connection with someone accused as a Presidential assassin. No other reason stands the test of credibility.

Which is why, no doubt, you didn't offer any other reason...

Mark Ulrik Wrote:

Ben Holmes Wrote:

Mark Ulrik Wrote:Perhaps not by you.

Nor the HSCA - with the full power of the U.S. Government behind it. But this isn't the only example of a federal agency simply refusing to answer questions in the JFK case.

You don't know what you're talking about. The CIA didn't refuse to accommodate Blakey's request. That you weren't able to locate their response doesn't mean there wasn't any. You probably didn't try very hard.

Mark Ulrik Wrote:

Ben Holmes Wrote:

Mark Ulrik Wrote:Apparently, the HSCA reviewed the files and found no contact report. Did Larry come to a different conclusion?

The 'conclusions' are crystal clear - the CIA did not want to answer - the reasoning is simple, there was only one former Marine employed in a Minsk Radio Plant who returned in 1962. This makes it extremely obvious that Oswald was, at the very least, an unwitting intelligence asset.

And just as supporters cannot explain the refusal of the Warren Commission to call James Chaney to testify, they cannot explain why the CIA simply refused to provide the contact report which was so concisely pinpointed by someone who'd seen it.

But the HSCA inspected the files and found no contact report. How can you be sure it ever existed?

Mark Ulrik Wrote:

Ben Holmes Wrote:How can Larry come to any other conclusion? How would you be able to come to any other conclusion? The CIA didn't want to verify a connection with someone accused as a Presidential assassin. No other reason stands the test of credibility.

Which is why, no doubt, you didn't offer any other reason...

But the CIA did cooperate,

G. Robert Blakey Wrote:I am no longer confident that the Central Intelligence Agency co-operated with the committee. My reasons follow:

The committee focused, among other things, on (1) Oswald, (2) in New Orleans, (3) in the months before he went to Dallas, and, in particular, (4) his attempt to infiltrate an anti-Castro group, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil or DRE.

These were crucial issues in the Warren Commission's investigation; they were crucial issues in the committee's investigation. The Agency knew it full well in 1964; the Agency knew it full well in 1976-79.

Outrageously, the Agency did not tell the Warren Commission or our committee that it had financial and other connections with the DRE, a group that Oswald had direct dealings with!

What contemporaneous reporting is or was in the Agency's DRE files? We will never know, for the Agency now says that no reporting is in the existing files. Are we to believe that its files were silent in 1964 or during our investigation?

I don't believe it for a minute. Money was involved; it had to be documented. Period. End of story. The files and the Agency agents connected to the DRE should have been made available to the commission and the committee. That the information in the files and the agents who could have supplemented it were not made available to the commission and the committee amounts to willful obstruction of justice.

Obviously, too, it did not identify the agent who was its contact with the DRE at the crucial time that Oswald was in contact with it: George Joannides.

During the relevant period, the committee's chief contact with the Agency on a day-to-day basis was Scott Breckinridge. (I put aside our point of contact with the office of chief counsel, Lyle Miller) We sent researchers to the Agency to request and read documents. The relationship between our young researchers, law students who came with me from Cornell, was anything but "happy." Nevertheless, we were getting and reviewing documents. Breckinridge, however, suggested that he create a new point of contact person who might "facilitate" the process of obtaining and reviewing materials. He introduced me to Joannides, who, he said, he had arranged to bring out of retirement to help us. He told me that he had experience in finding documents; he thought he would be of help to us.

I was not told of Joannides' background with the DRE, a focal point of the investigation. Had I known who he was, he would have been a witness who would have been interrogated under oath by the staff or by the committee. He would never have been acceptable as a point of contact with us to retrieve documents. In fact, I have now learned, as I note above, that Joannides was the point of contact between the Agency and DRE during the period Oswald was in contact with DRE.

That the Agency would put a "material witness" in as a "filter" between the committee and its quests for documents was a flat out breach of the understanding the committee had with the Agency that it would co-operate with the investigation.

The committee's researchers immediately complained to me that Joannides was, in fact, not facilitating but obstructing our obtaining of documents. I contacted Breckinridge and Joannides. Their side of the story wrote off the complaints to the young age and attitude of the people.

They were certainly right about one question: the committee's researchers did not trust the Agency. Indeed, that is precisely why they were in their positions. We wanted to test the Agency's integrity. I wrote off the complaints. I was wrong; the researchers were right. I now believe the process lacked integrity precisely because of Joannides.

For these reasons, I no longer believe that we were able to conduct an appropriate investigation of the Agency and its relationship to Oswald. Anything that the Agency told us that incriminated, in some fashion, the Agency may well be reliable as far as it goes, but the truth could well be that it materially understates the matter.

What the Agency did not give us none but those involved in the Agency can know for sure. I do not believe any denial offered by the Agency on any point. The law has long followed the rule that if a person lies to you on one point, you may reject all of his testimony.

I now no longer believe anything the Agency told the committee any further than I can obtain substantial corroboration for it from outside the Agency for its veracity. We now know that the Agency withheld from the Warren Commission the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro. Had the commission known of the plots, it would have followed a different path in its investigation. The Agency unilaterally deprived the commission of a chance to obtain the full truth, which will now never be known.

Significantly, the Warren Commission's conclusion that the agencies of the government co-operated with it is, in retrospect, not the truth. We also now know that the Agency set up a process that could only have been designed to frustrate the ability of the committee in 1976-79 to obtain any information that might adversely affect the Agency. Many have told me that the culture of the Agency is one of prevarication and dissimulation and that you cannot trust it or its people. Period. End of story.

I am now in that camp.

Mark Ulrik Wrote:so what are you really saying? That they made the contact report disappear? I'd still like to know what Larry wrote about this, if you don't mind quoting him.

Larry Hancock Wrote:The Larry in question would be me, Larry Hancock. Actually in the book I add a bit of additional detail of the CBS investigation, led by Daniel Schorr, of the Minsk story. In his final report on the lead Schorr stated that the CIA had confirmed the asset - but that it an ex-Navy individual in a city other than Minsk. As might be expected they offered no proof and Schorr's informant - vetted as a former CIA employee - had been adamant from the beginning that the paperwork said Minsk and ex-Marine. One piece of CIA internal paperwork about Schorr's inquiry that later surfaced says it all though - it was a directive that measures had to be taken to "ensure Mr. Schorr does not learn anything that might cast the slightest doubt on the above account (ex-Navy, not Minsk) before he produces his program.

It's too bad Schorr never saw that particular piece of correspondence...

Scott Breckinridge Wrote:As soon as we have collected these materials you will be advised. As stated to you we are searching for not only a report of an interview of a former Marine who defected from the U.S.S.R. to the U.S. in 1962, but also a record I recall of a former Navy man who redefected from the U.S.S.R. to the U.S. in the same year. The latter may be the person remembered by your source; his files have already been reviewed by members of your staff.

Scott Breckinridge Wrote:We made available for review by a HSCA staff member the volume of materials referred to in your letter. There is no contact report. Your representative has confirmed this.

Paul Fahey Wrote:1. On 12 October 1978 Scott Breckenridge, Principal Coordinator for the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), Office of Legislative Counsel, forwarded a request from the HSCA (see attached). HSCA, while investigating the circumstances surrounding the death of President John Kennedy, had been informed that a CIA contact report (presumably an OOB report from Domestic Contacts Division) concerning the Minsk radio plant had been received and filed in the Minsk Radio Plant folder by CIA's Industrial Registry Branch (sic) which in 1962 was a component of the Office of Central Reference. The source of the 1962 report was believed to be a former US Marine who had defected to the USSR, and then returned to the United States in 1962. HSCA therefore wished to see the report mentioned by the informant and the dossier on the Minsk Radio Plant.

2. In July 1975, USSR Division had handled a similar request, in response to a query from Chief, Domestic Contacts Division (see Veronica Mariani's Memorandum for the Record dated 9 July 1975). At that time, the request was generated by an interview by Daniel Schorr with a former CIA employee who recalled seeing a DCD report on the radio plant in Minsk from a US re-defector who was a former Marine (apparently Lee Harvey Oswald). For this request, USSR Division searched the plant folders for the three radio plants in Minsk, as well as Intellofax (for DCD reports). There were no hits.

3. In 1975, Schorr--at the conclusion of his interview with the former CIA employee--reported that then CIA Director Colby had denied any record of a contact with Lee Harvey Oswald but that the Agency had reported that it had debriefed a re-defector in 1962 who was an ex-Navy man who had worked in a Soviet plant in another city. In October 1978, Mr. Brekenridge informed Chief, USSR Division, OCR, that the ex-Navy man was Robert E. Webster and that he had worked in Leningrad.

4. For the October 1978 HSCA request the following was done:

• --the files of the three radio plants in Minsk were searched again for OO reports from a US re-defector; no hits.
  
  --the Minsk Town Folder was searched for a similar document; no hits.
  
  --the biographic files were searched for information on Robert E. Webster; there was one hit (in the Consolidated File under R. E. VEBSTR)--an FBIS article (from the USSR Daily Report of 26 May 1960, pages BB 29-31) on a speech by Webster, then a USSR citizen working in the Leningrad Polymerization Institute.
  
  --the folder on the Leningrad Scientific Research Institute of Polymerization of Plastics was searched for an OO report from a US re-defector; there was one hit: OO-B 3,232,798, 14 August 1962.
  
  --on 16 October 1978, Mr. Gary Cornwell of the HSCA staff visited USSR Division and reviewed the files on the three radio plants, the Minsk Town Folder, the FBIS article on Webster and OO-B 3,232,798. After an hour's review of file material, Mr. Cornwell left. His only comment was that he really couldn't be sure what was the correct story, whether the HSCA informant did or did not confuse the Webster case with the other defector case.
  

Veronica Mariani Wrote:1. On 1 July 1975, the Central Reference Service (CRS) was contacted by the Chief, Domestic Contacts Division (DCD), and asked to use its facilities to search for a DCD document mentioned in the CBS evening news broadcast of 30 June 1975 (see attached transcript).

2. The USSR Division, CRS, conducted searches of the two files that might lead to the recovery of a document such as that mentioned in the CBS broadcast. The first search was of an installation file of three USSR radio plants in Minsk. No documents or document references pertinent to the subject were found.

3. The second search was of the Intellofax document retrieval system. The search was for DCD documents produced during 1961 and 1962 and coded for the geographic area Minsk. The search turned up 15 document references. All these documents were reviewed on aperture cards. None of the documents were pertinent to the subject mentioned on the CBS news broadcast.

William Colby Wrote:With respect to Oswald's one appearance in our records, I explained that CIA might well have shied off from any interview with him if there was an indication of prior FBI interest. As for the military, I said the Interagency Sourve Register did not indicate Mr. Oswald was a clandestine source and that DCS Joint Debriefing Program with the military services from 1953 on would probably have indicated any military debriefing for intelligence purposes, but none appear in our files, so I believed none had been conducted.

We parted with my assurance that anything else that arose which would cast doubt on my statements would be brought to Mr. Rather's attention. The two gentlemen expressed appreciation for our discussion.

COMMENT: From their attitude, I believe there is a good chance that the program will indicate that there is no CIA connection with Oswald beyond that noted above. This could make a contribution to knocking down the paranoic belief to the contrary. We must, however, insure that Mr. rather does [not] learn anything which would cause the slightest doubt on the above account before he produces the programs in November.

Larry Hancock Wrote:I thought it was pretty clear that the directive was internal within the Agency and that it was an advisory to make sure that Schorr did not come across anything that would make him further question the story that was given - to me that suggests that something else did exist, otherwise the directive would be pointless.

The point I would make, and its revealed in many other instances, is the the Agency will not willingly release information on its sources and assets, or its employees for that matter. Sometimes things do slip though the cracks but generally Agency officers will do whatever is necessary including refusal to testify or making false statements in court under oath. The interesting thing about that, as I explore in great detail in my book Shadow Warfare, is that those officers are legally bound under National Security legislation and related legal code to do just that. There is a direct conflict between their obligation under that legislation and to what they deal with under both federal and civil law. In fact, the National Security act authorizes them to commit actions which would be illegal under other code, putting them in double jeopardy. Because of that its simply naive to expect them to provide open access to any and all information - and when challenged in court on FOIA they can almost always convince a judge that they are acting under the National Security act. A little far afield from the issue at hand but its important to understand the rules that actually control disclosure.